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Abstract
This paper explores implications of climate change for fiscal policy by assessing the 
impact of large scale extreme weather events on changes in public budgets. We apply 
alternative measures for large scale extreme weather events and conclude that the 
budgetary impact of such events ranges between 0.23% and 1.1% of GDP depending 
on the country group. Developing countries face a much larger effect on changes in 
budget balances following an extreme weather event than do advanced economies. 
Based on these findings, we discuss implications for fiscal policy and publicly-
provided disaster insurance. Our policy conclusions point to the enhanced need to 
reach and maintain sound fiscal positions given that climate change is expected to 
cause an increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters. 
Keywords: Global warming, climate change, fiscal sustainability, disasters 
JEL Classification: Q54, Q58, F59, H87 5
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Non-technical Summary
In this paper, we assess empirically the impact of large scale extreme weather
events on budget balances and draw implications for ﬁscal policy.
One important consequence of global warming is the increase in the fre-
quency and intensity of extreme weather events. By considering this well-
researched fact this paper concentrates on past extreme weather events to
evaluate the budgetary eﬀect using a panel data set for 138 countries and
yearly data for a sample period from 1985 until 2007. We expect, for an
extreme weather event to exert a discernable eﬀect on the changes in bud-
get balances, it should be suﬃciently large causing damage to infrastructure,
human capital and production facilities. Hence we implement a decision rule
which allows us to consider only large scale extreme weather events in the
empirical analysis by applying the following criteria: (i) the number of per-
sons aﬀected is no less than one hundred thousand, (ii) the estimated damage
costs of the extreme weather events are no less than 1 billion US dollars (in
constant 2000 dollars), (iii) the number of persons killed is no less than one
thousand or (iv) the estimated damage costs are above two percent of GDP.
At least one of the criteria has to be satisﬁed in order to count as a large-scale
extreme weather event and to be included in our estimations.
Our baseline model is a ﬁxed eﬀects model with country and time speciﬁc
eﬀects. We extend the ﬁxed eﬀects model by estimating a two-stage least
squares model with country and time speciﬁc eﬀects to take into account
endogeneity. We consider four diﬀerent country groups: all countries, devel-
oping countries, OECD countries and EU countries. Our dependent variable
is the change in the nominal general government budget balance as percent-
age of GDP. We include macroeconomic, budgetary and political variables as
control variables but the main interest is on our diﬀerent measures of extreme
weather events. We construct a variable counting the number of large-scale
extreme weather disasters on the basis of the decision rule. We consider a
dummy variable taking the value one if at least one extreme weather event
in a given year and country complies with the decision rule and zero oth-
erwise. We scale the count variable by last year’s real GDP level. Finally,
we include in addition to the count variable an interaction term between the
count variable and the distance to the equator.
The empirical outcomes suggest that the budgetary impact of extreme
weather events ranges between 0.23% and 1.1% of GDP depending on the
country group and the measure for extreme weather events. Our ﬁndings ver-6
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ify that budget balances of developing countries with underdeveloped insti-
tutions and a low level of governance, i.e. young democracies, and developing
countries near the equator are least resilient to extreme weather events. We
do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant ﬁscal eﬀect of extreme weather events
for the OECD and EU countries corroborating that the ﬁscal position of
these countries is less vulnerable to extreme weather events whereas budget
balances in developing countries can deteriorate substantially.
Since governments have managed to cope with this additional burden so
far, it is not advisable to call for ”big” policy solutions, like a large-scale
supranational fund, as they might create huge moral hazard. Only if the
extreme weather events get more costly, then already available policies, such
as the UN Fund, could be propped up. In the meantime, governments could
do a lot to prevent the huge costs of extreme events, like improved early
warning systems, better regulation, better information, etc. In a nutshell, our
policy conclusions point to the enhanced need to reach and maintain sound
ﬁscal positions given that climate change is expected to cause an increase in
the frequency and severity of natural disasters.7
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1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that man-made climate change takes place and
that it is caused by the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases that are accumulating in the atmosphere. The report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that, in the absence
of emission control policies, global temperatures will increase by 2.8◦Co n
average over the next century, with best-guess increases ranging from 1.8◦C
to 4◦C across countries based on the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
(SRES). As a result, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events
will increase in the 21st century (IPCC, 2007). The Stern report argues that
due to the fact that damage from storms scales as a cube (or more) of wind
speed, costs of extreme weather are estimated to reach 0.5% to around 1%
of global GDP annually by 2050 (Stern, 2007). Other studies (e.g. by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the World Meterological Organisa-
tion (2003) and Hoyos et al. (2006)) show that hurricane power dissipation
is highly correlated with temperature, reﬂecting global warming. Hurricane
modeling has produced similar results, ﬁnding that hurricanes, simulated un-
der warmer, high CO2 conditions, are more intense than under present-day
conditions.
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a better under-
standing of the ﬁscal dimension of climate change by assessing empirically
the impact of extreme weather events on changes in budget balances. So
far only sparse research has evolved on the macroeconomic eﬀects of natural
disasters, but none of these studies examines the impact of climate change
on public ﬁnances.
By concentrating on one aspect of global warming - namely the impact
of extreme weather events - this paper does not venture too far into the
unknown: First, the scientiﬁc link between global warming and extreme
weather events is well-researched but the wider eﬀects of global warming
are still much debated (for an overview see Helm, 2003). This implies that
any paper looking at the ﬁscal impact of climate change in general ventures
into a far more speculative ﬁeld. Second, by concentrating on past extreme
weather events this paper draws lessons from the past - which is in many8
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ways less provisional than running simulations for the next 50 years.
Before going into the main text, it is useful to deﬁne extreme weather
events and review their transmissions channels on ﬁscal policy. Extreme
weather events are a special type of natural disasters, so called ”hydrome-
teorological” ones, caused by storm and precipitation, including ﬂoods, as
well as intense heat.1 The broader concept ”natural disaster” is deﬁned as
situations or events that cause human and material damage at a scale which
overwhelms local capacity and requires national or international assistance.
Extreme weather events could aﬀect ﬁscal policies in two ways: First, a
”direct ﬁscal impact” is related to the relief payments and the ﬁnancing of
public disaster response. Second, a drop in output and the negative wealth
eﬀect caused by the disaster can be seen to cause some ”indirect ﬁscal im-
pact” through various transmission channels in the economy causing lower
tax revenues, increasing public outlays on social payments etc. The overall
magnitude of the ﬁscal impact of extreme weather events is not well under-
stood at present.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section
reviews the existing literature and highlights our contribution to it. Section
three surveys the historical incidence of extreme weather events. In the fourth
section we describe the data employed and the various factors that might
aﬀect ﬁscal balances. In section ﬁve we present and discuss the empirical
research methodology and estimation results. In addition, we present several
robustness checks. While deriving ﬁscal policy implications in section six,
the ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Literature Overview and Motivation
The interest of policymakers in the implications of climate change is increas-
ing rapidly. As a result, also research on the macroeconomic eﬀects of climate
change has gained in importance. Recent studies discuss the need of climate
change policies for mitigation and adaptation by emphasizing that climate
change causes negative supply shocks triggering a decline in global economic
1Extreme weather events comprise the following disasters: drought, extreme tempera-
ture, ﬂood, mass movement dry, mass movement wet, storm, wildﬁre.9
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growth (Stern, 2007; IMF, 2007; IMF, 2008; Lacunza, 2008; Azis, 2008; Goel-
tom, 2008). A literature survey by the IMF (2008) concludes that the losses of
GDP range between 0 and 3 per cent of GDP for every 3◦C of global warming.
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Str¨ omberg (2007) and Dayton-Johnson (2006)
point out that the vulnerability to climate change varies among countries.
In particular, developing countries seem to be the most vulnerable as these
are countries with warmer climates, worse initial macroeconomic conditions,
higher income inequality and lower government eﬀectiveness. Moreover, in-
ﬂationary pressures might arise due to declines in supply of goods and in
aggregate productivity (IMF, 2008). Most of the above studies acknowledge
that the macroeconomic impact will be compounded further if climate change
precipitates extreme weather events. Hence, the focus of this study will be
on extreme weather events.
A large number of studies have assessed both the short-run as well as
the long-run macroeconomic impacts of natural disasters.2 The impact of
natural disasters appears at ﬁrst sight ambiguous. As Noy and Nualsri (2007)
state, it depends substantially on the theoretical growth model underlying the
argumentation. On the one hand, neoclassical models predict an increase in
output growth following a natural disaster since the losses due to the disaster
provide opportunities to update the capital stock and adopt new technologies.
Endogenous growth models, on the other hand, may ascribe negative growth
due to a disaster, in particular, as a result of destruction in human capital and
technology. The results by Skidmore and Toya (2002) suggest that a higher
frequency in natural disasters is associated with higher growth rates in the
long-run. In contrast, Noy and Nualsri (2007) show that a natural disaster
destroying human capital has a negative impact on growth, while they do
not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on output with regard to natural
disasters leading to a reduction in physical capital. Furthermore, Gassebner
et al. (2008) and Yang (2006) provide some statistically signiﬁcant evidence
that disasters have a negative impact on international trade and ﬁnancial
ﬂows. These ﬁndings give an indication of the severity that disasters might
have on the economies.
2Note that extreme weather events are a subset of natural disasters, which include also
earthquakes.10
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Raddatz (2007), Noy (2008) and Rasmussen (2004) ﬁnd that natural dis-
asters can have short-run adverse eﬀects on the economy. Analyzing a panel
of countries simultaneously they consider various variables for measuring the
magnitude of a disaster. Their estimation results show that direct damage
costs of natural disasters are associated with a 0.5 to 3 percent decrease of
the same-year real GDP growth rate. Hence, for the analysis in this paper
this suggests that there is a ﬁscal indirect impact caused by this drop in
output growth. Moreover, a few papers explore the ﬁscal impact of natu-
ral disasters on the basis of case studies (Heipertz and Nickel, 2008; Benson
and Clay, 2004). Heipertz and Nickel (2008) conclude that the total ef-
fect (including the direct and indirect impact) of extreme weather events
on public ﬁnances varied between 0.3 to 1.1 per cent of GDP. Schuknecht
(1999) estimates a ﬁxed eﬀects model for 25 developing countries to study
whether countries with diﬀerent exchange rate regimes engage diﬀerently in
expansionary ﬁscal policies around elections. In his regression he includes
catastrophes as a control variable indicating that these weaken government’s
ﬁscal position through budget-ﬁnanced relief measures and revenue loss. He
ﬁnds a strongly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of catastrophes on ﬁscal balances
(Schuknecht, 1999).3 Furthermore, several papers discuss the implications
of natural disasters for ﬁscal policies (IMF 2008, Wildasin 2007), yet except
from the paper by Schuknecht (1999) and Heipertz and Nickel (2008) none
of them conducts an ex post analysis.
A signiﬁcant body of literature deals with coping strategies in the after-
math of a disaster with a special focus on natural disaster insurance and
the adaptive capacity of countries (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Kunreuther, 2006;
Dayton-Johnson, 2004; IMF, 2007). These authors suggest that the creation
of innovative ﬁnancial instruments and the implementation of eﬃcient pri-
vate and public disaster insurance schemes are necessary to lower the cost of
relief and to guarantee sustainable growth.
This paper aims to extend the analysis to a multi-country framework
using panel data for 138 countries. In particular, we note that the impact
of extreme weather events on ﬁscal balances depends on the severity of the
3Schuknecht’s study is restricted to 25 developing countries. Moreover, he considers all
natural catastrophes whereas our focus lies on extreme weather events.11
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event, the economic size, the geography as well as the resilience4 of the af-
fected country. To this end we further refer to the literature on what factors
determine ﬁscal balances. A vast literature has emerged on identifying the
factors that drive ﬁscal balances and the accumulation of debt (see, for ex-
ample, Tujula and Wolswijk, 2007; Hallerberg et al. 2004; Hallerberg and
von Hagen, 1999; Woo, 2003; Gali and Perotti, 2003). These studies in-
clude variables that emphasize the role of economic, ﬁscal, political as well
as institutional factors to determine driving forces behind budgetary trends.
In our empirical analysis we include several of the identiﬁed factors as con-
trol variables, yet our main focus remains on extreme weather events as an
explanatory variable.5
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, to
our best knowledge there is no study which identiﬁes the impact of extreme
weather events on budget balances in a panel data set-up. Second, most of
the studies on the determinants of budgetary trends fail to take into account
heterogeneity or the endogeneity problem. We try to solve this caveat by
conducting not only a panel ﬁxed eﬀects estimation but also an instrumen-
tal variable ﬁxed eﬀects estimation and a generalized-method-of-moments
(GMM) system estimation. The latter, which we conduct as a robustness
check, allows us to account for unobserved country-speciﬁc eﬀects as well as
using internal instruments, that is, instruments based on lagged values of the
explanatory variables, to control for endogeneity.
3 Some Stylized Facts about the Incidence of
Extreme Weather Events
The data on extreme weather events applied in this paper are derived from
the Emergency Events database (EM-DAT) maintained by the Centre for Re-
search and the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) of the Universit´ e Catholique
4Resilience in this context means the ability of a country to deal with extreme weather
events. This includes the preparedness of the country in terms of adaptation but also the
structural ﬂexibility of the economy such as ﬂexible labour and product markets.
5The construction of the extreme weather event variable and their impact on public
budgets will be explained in section four. Moreover, all the other independent variables
will be described.12
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de Louvain. The database includes the number of persons killed, the number
of persons aﬀected, the number of persons injured as well as the estimated
economic damage costs given in thousands of USD. The sample period from















































Figure 1: Frequency of Extreme Weather Events for 138 countries, 1985 -
2007
Figures 1 and 2 show the frequency and the estimated economic damage
costs of these events, which have increased noticeably. Hydrometeorological
natural disasters are estimated to have caused around 29.7 bn USD of real
economic damage on a global scale in 2006 and 58.6 bn USD in 2007 (Below et
al. 2008). Aggregated at country level, the highest absolute damage occurred
in the United Kingdom at around 9.6 bn USD, whereas the highest relative
economic damage was caused in Oman, which lost close to 9.6 % of GDP
in 2006 due to a cyclone. The observed rise in the occurrence of natural
disasters might only stem from improvements in reporting and collecting
data on emergency events, yet as mentioned above there is scientiﬁc support
6A list of countries under consideration can be found in Appendix A.13
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Figure 2: Estimated damage costs per year (in billions of 2000 USD), 1985 -
2007
that climate change has led to a higher frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events (IPCC, 2007).
The majority of the 4,671 events are of smaller size and it seems unlikely
that all of these have a considerable impact on public ﬁnances at the national
level. For an extreme weather event to exert a substantial eﬀect on the
change in budget balances, it should be suﬃciently large causing damage to
infrastructure, human capital and production facilities. This would imply
that the direct ﬁscal impact is of considerable magnitude resulting from high
relief payments and soaring costs for the ﬁnancing of public disaster response.
Furthermore, a resulting fall in tax revenues and rise in public outlays of
social payments induces also a large indirect ﬁscal impact.
As a consequence we implement a decision rule, similar to Gassebner et al.
(2008), which allows us to consider only large-scale extreme weather events
in the empirical analysis.7 We apply the following criteria: (i) the number
7Gassebner et al. (2008) elaborate that Munich Re, a reinsurance company in Ger-
many, adopts several categories to classify disasters. According to Munich Re, in line with
the UN deﬁnition, a great natural disaster is an event where ”the aﬀected region’s ability14
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of persons aﬀected is no less than one hundred thousand, (ii) the estimated
damage costs of the extreme weather events are no less than 1 billion US
dollars (in constant 2000 dollars), (iii) the number of persons killed is no less
than one thousand or (iv) the estimated damage costs are above two percent
of GDP. At least one of the criteria has to be satisﬁed in order to count as a
large-scale extreme weather event and be included in our estimations. Due
to the adoption of the decision rule the number of extreme weather events
is reduced to 1,044 events. Most of these extreme weather events fulﬁll the
ﬁrst criterion, while the other criteria are rarely hit. Figure 3 demonstrates
that the frequency of large-scale extreme weather events has increased in the
sample period as well. In addition, Table 1 provides details on the extreme



























































Figure 3: Frequency of extreme weather events according to the decision rule,
1985 - 2007
to help itself is distinctly overtaxed, if one ore more of the following factors apply: In-
terregional or international assistance is necessary; thousands are killed and/or hundreds
of thousands are made homeless; substantial overall losses and/or considerable insured
losses” (MunichRe, 2008).15
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Table 1: Extreme Weather Events Satisfying Decision Rule
Number of Number of Estimated Estimated Number of
persons aﬀected damage costs damage costs disasters
killed more persons more more than higher than satisfying
than 1,000 than 100,000 1 billion US dollars 2 percent of GDP decision rule
Extreme
weather 48 794 188 129 1044
events
4 Factors Determining Budget Balances
The economic research on the determinants of budget balances has been
going on for several decades. To analyze the impact of extreme weather
events on changes in budget balances we choose the following variables as
factors determining changes in budget balances:8
The choice of the budgetary measure for the dependent variable is widely
discussed in the literature. The discussion focuses on whether to select nom-
inal or cyclically adjusted, central or general government data and whether
it should be a ﬂow (budget deﬁcit) or stock (debt) variable.9 In this paper,
we opt for the change in the nominal general government budget balance as
percentage of GDP (Δbudget) as the dependent variable. Several reasons jus-
tify this choice in the context of our research questions: (1) There are some
serious caveats in estimating cyclically adjusted balances for such a large
and diverse group of countries as the one we consider here. (2) Governments
usually target ﬂows, therefore concentrating on the change in the budget bal-
ance seems appropriate. (3) The concept of the general government allows
for a wider country coverage than any other ﬁscal variable.10 In addition,
the time series properties of the data are such that the level of the nominal
general government balance is non-stationary. By choosing the change in the
budget balance instead of the level we circumvent this problem.11 From an
8The deﬁnitions, sources and some descriptive statistics of the data are listed in Ap-
pendix B.
9For a thorough discussion on the choice of the dependent variable see Tujula and
Wolswijk, 2007.
10Only if no data is available for the general government, we refer to central government
data.
11A similar argument applies to the debt variable. We run panel unit root tests for these
variables conﬁrming that budget and debt are non-stationary in levels but stationary in
ﬁrst-diﬀerences. The results are available from the authors upon request.16
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economic point of view, it does not make much of a diﬀerence whether one
uses the level or the change in the budget balance as the dependent variable.
As Gali and Perotti (2003) state: “We do not have a strong view on what is
the appropriate measure of the ﬁscal stance, whether the level or the change
in the deﬁcit. The choice of the indicator of the ﬁscal policy stance depends
very much on the underlying model of the economy and the notion on policy
stance one has in mind.” (p.12).
The main interest of this paper is in the coeﬃcient of the extreme weather
events variable. To this end, we consider the following alternative extreme
weather events variables in the analysis:
1. Disrule is our variable accounting for extreme weather disasters oc-
curring in a given year and country. We expect that extreme weather
disasters have a negative impact on ﬁscal balances through a direct and
indirect eﬀect, which we, however, do not distinguish here. We con-
struct a variable counting the number of large-scale extreme weather
disasters on the basis of the decision rule described in section 3.
2. A dummy variable (disdummy) taking the value one if at least one ex-
treme weather event in a given year and country complies with the
decision rule and zero otherwise.
3. We scale the variable disrule by last year’s real GDP level (disscale).
4. We include in addition to the disrule variable an interaction term be-
tween disrule and distance to the equator (disrule ∗ distance).
We consider the last three alternatives when we perform robustness checks.12
12We also considered to include other measures for extreme weather events like the
number of persons aﬀected satisfying the decision rule and disrule scaled by last year’s
population or interacted with population density. Taking these measures into account
would imply that countries with a higher population or population density should ex-
perience a higher budgetary impact of extreme weather events. But this correlation is
ambiguous as, for example, small island countries have small populations but can still
be aﬀected strongly by an extreme weather event. Also, for example, Luxembourg is a
country with a high population density, yet rarely experiences extreme weather events,
whereas China with a lower population density is one of the countries to be struck most
by extreme weather events.17
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Concerning other independent variables as control variables, we have de-
cided to include the following budgetary, macroeconomic, and political vari-
ables in the estimations:13
The lagged change in the debt ratio (Δdebtt−1) takes into account the
debt stabilization motive of governments and is a priori indeterminate. A
higher debt ratio puts pressure on the government to improve budget bal-
ances in order to achieve long-term sustainability of the ﬁscal position. On
the contrary, higher debt ratios imply higher interest payments and as a re-
sult lead to a worsening of the budgetary balance. On the whole, we expect
the sustainability motive to be stronger and therefore a positive coeﬃcient.
A lagged dependent variable could have been included as well since it ac-
counts for the likely autocorrelation of budget decisions. Yet, the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable would require estimating a dynamic model
applying the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM or system GMM estimator (Arellano and
Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bover, 1998). But considering that changes in debt
ratios will be already included and the sample properties of the mentioned
GMM estimators hold for large N and small T, we have decided to exclude
lagged changes in the budget balance as a right-hand side variable for the
main regressions.14
Real GDP growth (realgdpg) and the output gap (gdpgap) should aﬀect
budget balances through automatic stabilisers and possibly anti-cyclical ﬁs-
cal policies. Therefore, increases in budget deﬁcits are assumed to emerge
during recessions and decreases during booms. Hence, we expect a positive
coeﬃcient.
Inﬂation (inflation) can aﬀect the budgetary balance through various
channels. On the one hand, real tax revenues may be reduced resulting in
higher budget deﬁcits. Moreover, inﬂation leads to higher long-term interest
rates implying higher debt servicing costs and as a consequence a worsening
of the ﬁscal balance. On the other hand, inﬂation may positively aﬀect the
ﬁscal balance via the bracket creep on income tax revenue and also through
eroding the value of nominal government debt.
For the lagged change in the long term interest rate (Δlit−1) we expect
13The choice of the independent variables was in part also limited by data availability
14A dynamic model speciﬁcation will be considered when conducting robustness checks.18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1055
May 2009
it to have a negative impact on the budget balance as an increase of interest
rates results in higher interest expenditure on newly issued and reﬁnanced
debt.15
The legislative election (legelec) variable constitutes a dummy variable
taking the value of one in a given year when a new parliamentary election
took place in this year. It should reﬂect political business cycles meaning
that during election years politicians are more willing to increase spending
and reduce taxes (see e.g. Hallerberg et al., 2004). Therefore, a negative
impact on the change in the budget balances is expected.
5 Econometric Methodology and Estimation
Results
To estimate the impact of extreme weather events on budget balances we use
a panel data set for 138 countries and yearly data for a sample period from
1985 until 2007.16 Our model can be expressed as follows:
Δbit = α + X
 
itβ + γDit +  it (1)
with  it = μi + λt + νit. The dependent variable Δbit is the change in the
budget balance in terms of GDP for country i at time t. Xit is a vector
including macroeconomic, budgetary and political control variables as de-
scribed above, while Dit stands for the alternative extreme weather events
variables, our main variables of interest. The country speciﬁc eﬀect and the
disturbance term are denoted as μi and νit, respectively. We will consider,
in particular four diﬀerent samples of countries: full, developing countries,
OECD and EU countries.17 All regressions include time-ﬁxed eﬀects, which
are not further discussed.
The usual empirical strategy followed by most authors determining fac-
tors of budget deﬁcits is either based on pooled OLS estimation (including
15Since data on the long term interest rate are not available for developing countries,
we include this variable only when referring to the OECD and EU sample.
16The data are not available for all countries for the whole sample period; as a conse-
quence the panel data set is unbalanced.
17We refer to the EU15 countries before EU enlargement in May 2004.19
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country-speciﬁc eﬀects) or an instrumental variable (IV) estimation to ac-
count for endogeneity. Our baseline model will be a ﬁxed eﬀects model with
country and time speciﬁc eﬀects. We will extend it by estimating a two-stage
least squares model with ﬁxed eﬀects. Subsequently, the empirical results are
discussed for the diﬀerent empirical methodologies applied.
5.1 Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Estimating a ﬁxed eﬀects model takes into account country-speciﬁc charac-
teristics and is generally more appropriate than the random eﬀects model
when studying macro data. If the country-speciﬁc eﬀect represents omitted
variables, it is highly likely that these eﬀects are correlated with the other
independent variables (Judson and Owen, 1997). Table 2 reports the esti-
mated coeﬃcients, the p-values in parentheses and the R-squared of the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity for all
four samples. All the macroeconomic variables that are signiﬁcant have the
expected sign.
Table 2: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
All Developing OECD EU
Δdebtt−1 0.016** 0.015* 0.059** 0.092**
(0.044) (0.087) (0.014) (0.014)
realgdpg 0.173*** 0.134*** 0.216*** 0.157*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.055)
inflation 0.025*** 0.027*** -0.004 0.051
(0.000) (0.000) (0.909) (0.516)
disrule -0.230*** -0.277** -0.075 -0.120
(0.004) (0.016) (0.350) (0.492)
legelec -0.128 -0.083 -0.315** -0.390**
(0.501) (0.803) (0.023) (0.034)
Δlit−1 -0.123*** -0.217
(0.001) (0.151)
cons -0.556 -1.452* -0.192 -0.848
(0.244) (0.083) (0.650) (0.170)
R-squared 0.064 0.044 0.334 0.311
Obs 1632 954 435 278
Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in
parenthesis.20
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The lagged change in the debt ratio produces a statistically signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient for all samples indicating that counties with growing debt
ratios commence consolidation eﬀorts to improve the budget balance.18 The
real GDP growth rate is signiﬁcant for all samples.19 Yet, the reported
income elasticities are rather low compared to the ﬁndings of other studies,
where income elasticities range between 0.25 and 0.5 for OECD countries
(van den Noord, 2000; Viren, 2000). However, lower values are expected
for developing countries, and for the OECD and EU countries our results
are in line with the ﬁndings of Tujula and Wolswijk (2007). Inﬂation is
statistically signiﬁcant and positively related to budget balances in the full
and developing countries sample. This result reﬂects, on the one hand, the
bracket creep on income tax revenue and on the other hand, the seignorage
motive of governments in developing countries to erode the nominal value of
debt. With regard to the lagged change in the nominal long term interest rate
we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence that the eﬀect on budget balances is
negative for the OECD countries. A one percent increase in the nominal long-
term interest rate deteriorates the budget balance in the order of 0.12 percent
of GDP for the OECD countries. The election dummy exhibits a negative
coeﬃcient for the OECD and EU countries. These results corroborate that
not only economic and ﬁscal factors explain observed budgetary changes,
but they also provide support for the claim that election-oriented policies
are pursued. Budget balances deteriorate between 0.31 and 0.39 percent of
GDP in legislative election years.20 These ﬁndings are in line with Tujula
and Wolswijk (2007).
The disrule variable, our main variable of interest, is statistically signif-
icant for the full sample and developing countries sample indicating that
large scale extreme weather events have a negative ﬁscal impact. An addi-
18The values for the lagged debt ratio are in line with values found by Tujula and
Wolswijk (2007) and Afonso (2005).
19When including the output gap instead of the real GDP growth rate similar results are
obtained and can be requested from the authors. Moreover, problems and uncertainties to
the computation of output gaps are widely discussed and acknowledged in the literature.
As a result, we prefer the real GDP growth rate.
20As a robustness check for the political cycle hypothesis we also substitute the dummy
of legislative election with a dummy of executive election when considering developing
countries. But the eﬀect remains insigniﬁcant.21
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tional large scale extreme weather event implies a 0.23% and 0.27% lower
change in the budget balance in terms of GDP for all and developing coun-
tries, respectively. Compared to the ﬁndings of Heipertz and Nickel (2008),
who concentrate on speciﬁc cases of extreme weather events, the magnitude
seems rather low. Yet, Heipertz and Nickel assess extreme weather events
which caused very high damage costs, whereas we take into consideration a
wider range of extreme weather events, some of which might have been less
devastating as the ones assessed by Heipertz and Nickel.
5.2 Instrumental Variable Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
A majority of studies uses the IV ﬁxed eﬀects method when determining the
factors behind budget balances (e.g. Brosens and Wierts, 2007). In general,
this methodology solves the endogeneity problem caused by including the
real GDP growth rate, which is likely to be endogenous to budget balances.
Therefore, we instrument it using its own lags and the lagged output gap.
Table 3: IV Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
All Developing OECD EU
Δdebtt−1 0.017*** 0.015** 0.067*** 0.095***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002)
inflation 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.003 0.048
(0.000) (0.001) (0.934) (0.498)
realgdpg 0.207*** 0.137* 0.294*** 0.203***
(0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.004)
disrule -0.233* -0.277* -0.081 -0.117
(0.060) (0.100) (0.438) (0.600)
legelec -0.125 -0.083 -0.321** -0.381*
(0.539) (0.800) (0.032) (0.070)
Δlit−1 -0.131*** -0.212*
(0.001) (0.100)
cons -0.730 -0.328 -0.566 -0.354
(0.282) (0.852) (0.190) (0.564)
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.34 0.34
Obs 1632 954 435 278
Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Real GDP growth is instrumented by
its lags and the lagged output gap. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in parenthesis.
Overall, the regression results of the IV ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation (Table22
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3) replicate the results when applying the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation method.
The eﬀect of large scale extreme weather events is still signiﬁcant for the full
and developing countries sample, and we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
ﬁscal impact for the OECD and EU countries. Nonetheless, the estimation
results are interesting since they yield higher income elasticities for the OECD
and EU countries compared to the previous estimations coming into reach of
the values noted by Melitz (2000) and Viren (2000).
5.3 Robustness Checks
We run several robustness checks and consider this way some caveats asso-
ciated with either our estimation method or the applied data.
Dynamic Panel Estimation
Appendix C contains regression results of dynamic model speciﬁcations where
we take the lagged dependent variable into consideration. We implement the
two-step ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and the two-step system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and
Bover (1998). This estimation method allows us to control for endogeneity
and heterogeneity. As reported, for the full sample the impact of large scale
extreme weather events on the changes in the budget balances remains neg-
ative and the size of the magnitude is comparable to the results obtained so
far.
Young Democracies
Extreme weather events are mainly described as exogenous shocks to the
economy in the literature. Yet, there might be some reasons to assume that
extreme weather events are endogenous, especially in advanced economies.
These economies usually have sophisticated publicly ﬁnanced disaster re-
sponse and relief instruments at their disposal like early warning systems.
Accordingly, these countries are prepared to smooth the negative budgetary
impact of extreme weather events. To exclude this possible endogenous bias
and since we do not have appropriate instruments, we also estimate regres-
sions for a sample of young democracies assuming that these countries are23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1055
May 2009
lacking behind advanced economies in developing appropriate disaster re-
sponse measures. As a result, the natural disaster variable is assumed to be
exogenous with more certainty. We classify young democracies as the ones
that have evolved between 1960 and 2003 (see Kapstein and Converse, 2006).
Table 4: Young Democracies















Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Real GDP growth is instrumented by
its lags and the lagged output gap. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in parenthesis.
The results reported in Table 4 conﬁrm that there is a statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative budgetary impact of extreme weather events. Moreover,
the eﬀect of large scale extreme weather events is more pronounced for these
countries as an additional large scale extreme weather event is associated
with a 0.47% higher change in the budget deﬁcit in terms of GDP. These
ﬁndings verify that developing countries with underdeveloped institutions
and a low level of governance are less resilient to extreme weather events.
Countries Near the Equator
Given that countries with a warmer climate are more vulnerable with re-
gard to extreme weather events than others, we include an interaction term24
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between disrule and distance to the equator to control for this fact.21 We
expect for the budgetary impact of extreme weather events to decrease the
further away countries are from the equator. The empirical ﬁndings reported
in Table 5 conﬁrm that the ﬁscal impact is higher for countries nearer the
equator. The budgetary eﬀect is reduced between 0.019% and 0.025% if the
distance of a country’s capital city increases by one latitude.
Table 5: IV and Fixed Eﬀects Estimation with disrule ∗ distance
All Developing All Developing
Δdebtt−1 0.016** 0.014* 0.017*** 0.015**
(0.043) (0.086) (0.001) (0.013)
inflation 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
realgdpg 0.174*** 0.136*** 0.208*** 0.140*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089)
disrule -0.826*** -0.977*** -0.841** -0.979**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.025)
disrule ∗ distance 0.019** 0.025*** 0.019* 0.025*
(0.016) (0.007) (0.061) (0.080)
legelec -0.143 -0.100 -0.141 -0.100
(0.454) (0.765) (0.490) (0.760)
cons -0.502 -1.167* -0.676 -0.260
(0.294) (0.089) (0.319) (0.882)
R-squared 0.063 0.046 0.061 0.044
Obs 1632 954 1631 953
Notes: Column 1 and 2 replicate the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation while column 3 and 4 show
the results of the IV ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported.
Real GDP growth is instrumented by its lags and the lagged output gap. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in
parenthesis.
Alternative Measures for Extreme Weather Events
Finally, we use alternative measures for large scale extreme weather events.
We employ a dummy taking the value one if at least one extreme weather
event in a given year and country complies with the constructed decision
21The distance to the equator is measured as the absolute value of latitude of the capital
city.25
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rule. With regard to the macroeconomic and the election variable there are
no fundamental changes.
Table 6: IV Fixed Eﬀects Estimation with disdummy
All Developing OECD EU
Δdebtt−1 0.016*** 0.014** 0.066*** 0.098***
(0.001) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002)
inflation 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.004 0.052
(0.000) (0.001) (0.904) (0.463)
realgdpg 0.210*** 0.142 0.290*** 0.218***
(0.000) (0.111) (0.000) (0.003)
Δopenness 0.024** 0.020 0.013 0.009
(0.027) (0.182) (0.463) (0.691)
disdummy -0.781*** -1.083*** -0.168 0.017
(0.003) (0.005) (0.439) (0.960)
legelec -0.140 -0.131 -0.317** -0.381*
(0.492) (0.689) (0.034) (0.070)
Δlit−1 -0.131*** -0.207
(0.002) (0.115)
cons -0.723 -0.237 -0.456 -0.786
(0.299) (0.893) (0.295) (0.213)
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.34 0.34
Obs 1631 953 434 277
Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Real GDP growth is instrumented by
its lags and the lagged output gap. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in parenthesis.
Yet, the coeﬃcient of the dummy suggests for the full and developing
countries sample when applying IV ﬁxed eﬀects estimation that if at least
one large scale extreme weather event occurred this caused deterioration in
the ﬁscal deﬁcit of 0.78% and 1.08%, respectively (see Table 6).22 Clearly,
the magnitude is much higher compared to the results obtained before and
in line with the ﬁndings of Heipertz and Nickel (2008).
So far the results imply that it obviously makes a diﬀerence whether the
country hit by an extreme weather event is rich or poor. As a result, we
scale the number of extreme weather events by last year’s real GDP level
22For the sake of brevity we do not report the results of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation
methods when applying the extreme weather events dummy, since the results replicate the
ones displayed here.26
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of a country (disscale).23 Inclusion of this variable for the full sample and
developing countries sample leaves all other variables unchanged, but the
coeﬃcient of the rescaled extreme weather event variable suggests that the
change in budget balances is negatively aﬀected by the incidence of a large
scale extreme weather event, and the more so the smaller the country in
economic size (see Table 7).
















Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Real GDP growth is instrumented by
its lags and the lagged output gap. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. */**/*** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in parenthesis.
The empirical results of the robustness checks further corroborate that the
ﬁscal position of developed countries like the OECD and EU countries is less
vulnerable to extreme weather events whereas budget balances in developing
countries can deteriorate substantially.
6 Fiscal Policy Implications
The results of our analysis show that the budgetary impact of extreme
weather events seems to be more pronounced in developing countries than in
23We take into account last year’s GDP since the current year’s GDP has been aﬀected
by the extreme weather event itself.27
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advanced economies. So far, large parts of ﬁscal costs in developing countries
could only be covered with the help of oﬃcial foreign ﬁnancing. Without for-
eign ﬁnancial ﬂows the negative eﬀect on budget balances would be more
pronounced.
In advanced economies the budgetary impact of extreme weather events
seems to have had a limited magnitude in terms of GDP and, therefore,
also limited impact on the sustainability of public ﬁnances in the long term
or even on the solvency of governments in the short term. This does not
exclude that future events might lead to a more serious situation for public
budgets, especially if global warming is more severe than currently assumed.
Nevertheless we can note as one important result of this paper that, up to
now, public budgets have been able to accommodate hydrometeorological
disasters fairly well.
The nature of extreme weather events - i.e. their high cost and low prob-
ability - would normally call for an insurance solution. Given the high cost
of the economic damage but the low (albeit rising) probability of the oc-
currence of extreme weather events, an insurance against the risk might be
the preferred solution, especially when adaptation is either not possible or
too costly. However, for catastrophes the essential risk is often aggregation,
i.e. the same event can cause losses to numerous policyholders of the same
insurer, so that the ability of that insurer to issue policies becomes con-
strained, not by factors surrounding the individual characteristics of a given
policyholder, but by the factors surrounding the sum of all policyholders so
exposed. Therefore the private sector might not be able to issue insurance
for all potentially aﬀected households or enterprises. An example is insur-
ance against ﬂooding, where the ability of an underwriter to issue a new
policy in certain areas depends on the number and size of the policies that
it has already underwritten. In extreme cases, the aggregation can aﬀect the
entire industry, since the combined capital of insurers and reinsurers can be
small compared to the needs of potential policyholders in areas exposed to
aggregation risk.
Though signiﬁcant private underinsurance is evident (see Munich Re,
2008), this does not automatically call for more public sector involvement,
as the public insurance option is loaded by various problems: First, the level28
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of government has to be decided. In principle, an insurance fund could be
assigned on the regional, the national or the supranational level. Given the
nature of extreme weather events, that more than often aﬀect large areas
across national boundaries, a supranational insurance might be the ﬁrst best
option. This could also circumvent the aggregation problem that in particular
a small country faces if a national insurance fund has to cover for losses in
an area that aﬀects a large part of the country. A supranational fund would
also spread the risk across a wider area. However, correlated shocks limit the
beneﬁts from risk-spreading. The ﬁnancing of such a supranational fund is
also problematic as it would require that many countries agree on one scheme.
The veriﬁcation of losses poses another problem because the more countries
the supranational fund covers the more stringent have to be the rules so
that fraud is avoided. Second, regardless of the level of government public
insurance could create moral hazard. For example, if the expectation of
public funds in case of a ﬂooding leads to disproportionate location in ﬂood-
prone areas, then this excessive risk-taking is an adverse corollary of public
insurance. This can only be countered by stringent government regulation.
In case of ﬂooding this might imply zoning regulations or the taxing of ﬂood-
prone or otherwise hazard-prone land.
The public insurance option has to be carefully assessed even in develop-
ing countries where our results show the highest budgetary impact of extreme
weather events. The set-up of a large scale supranational fund will consti-
tute a ﬁnancially and operationally challenging task. Moreover, the ﬁnancial
costs for a developing country to roll out adaptation and mitigation programs
for climate change could be extremely expensive, not only in relative terms.
As a result, external ﬁnancing might be necessary and the launch of a UN
fund in 2007 was a ﬁrst step towards donor coordination. The primary task
of governments in developing countries should be the economic and institu-
tional development since this will foster adaptation to climate change (IMF,
2007).
Though the public insurance option is not viable in many respects, still
governments can do quite a lot to keep the costs of extreme weather events
manageable. First, these measures pertain to regulation, in particular zon-
ing regulations or the taxing of ﬂood-prone or otherwise hazard-prone land.29
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In addition, the protection of open space, forests, wetlands and shorelines
could help. Forests act as ”sponges” for precipitation; riverside stands pro-
tect watersheds; and wetlands absorb runoﬀ and ﬁlter discharges ﬂowing
into bays and estuaries. Early warning systems have been shown to eﬀec-
tively reduce mortality associated with heat waves (Kalkstein 2000; Ebi et
al. 2004; Smith 2005). The eﬃciency in post-disaster management could
be enhanced. Where governments face considerable operational or ﬁnan-
cial constraints they could opt for private sector participation. Furthermore,
since ﬁnancial and insurance markets are underdeveloped in these countries,
governments should enhance the emergence of these by providing necessary
infrastructure and enforcing the building of institutional standards (Dayton-
Johnson, 2006).
In a nutshell, though the ﬁscal eﬀects of extreme weather events have been
relatively modest in most countries, especially in OECD countries, so far,
governments need to recognise and prepare for these random shocks because
climate change is expected to cause an increase in the number and severity
of extreme weather events. Given that many countries already have to cope
with the burden of an ageing population, achieving a sound ﬁscal position
now is vital to provide for the necessary safety margin to cope with more and
graver weather events. Cooperation between the public and private sector
will be essential easing operational and ﬁnancial constraints faced especially
by governments in developing countries.
7 Conclusion
Our regression results provide a ﬁrst basis for evaluating the budgetary im-
pact of extreme weather events in developing and advanced economies. As a
percentage of GDP the ﬁscal eﬀect of extreme weather events ranges around
0.23% for the full sample which is rather of limited size. Yet, when split-
ting the sample and estimating the regressions for developing or even young
democracies we ﬁnd that the impact rises up to 0.47% in terms of GDP. Fur-
thermore, taking into consideration that countries with a warmer climate are
more vulnerable with regard to extreme weather events than others we ﬁnd
that the ﬁscal impact is higher for countries nearer the equator. In addition30
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the eﬀect is even more magniﬁed when considering alternative measures of
extreme weather events. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the eﬀect
might be even larger for selected extreme weather events as shown in Heipertz
and Nickel (2008). On top, these estimation results do not account for second
round eﬀects from growing abatement and adjustment eﬀorts of governments,
which are likely to increase ﬁscal costs further. Still, it should be pointed
out that we did not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact of extreme weather
events for advanced economies.
So far, governments have managed to cope quite well with this additional
burden. However, this may change if climate change produced more and
more extreme weather events and already available disaster facilities might
increasingly prove as insuﬃcient. The ability to cope with these events will
depend on the starting position of each country: A country with a sound
public ﬁnance position, a high GDP per capita level and a resilient economy
will deal with an extreme weather event much better than a country that
already suﬀers from sustainability problems, last but not least because of
ageing populations.
Given the nature of the problem (high cost/low probability), private and
public insurances have a role to play. As it stands, private insurance of ex-
treme weather events is relatively limited and is most likely not to increase
much further because of the aggregation problem. But this does not automat-
ically call for more public sector involvement, as the public insurance option
is also loaded by problems. ”Big” policy solutions, like a large-scale suprana-
tional fund, are not advisable as they might create huge moral hazard. Only
if the extreme weather events get more costly, then already available policies,
such as the UN Fund, could be propped up. In the meantime, governments
could do a lot to prevent the huge costs of extreme events, like improved early
warning systems, better regulation, better information, etc. If, for example,
building regulations are improved, insurers might also be tempted to issue
more insurance against ﬂooding.
Finally, as our paper has shown, the quantiﬁcation of the ﬁscal impacts
of climate change is still underdeveloped. In particular, the link between
economic damage and the public budget needs further exploration. A dis-
aggregation of the damage costs would help to identify the eﬀect on the31
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components of budget balances. Also we could not make any explicit dis-
tinction between the direct and indirect ﬁscal impact. Therefore there are
still many avenues for further research.32
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Appendices
A List of Countries
Albania Ecuador Lithuania Slovenia
Algeria Egypt Luxembourg Solomon Islands
Antigua and Barbuda El Salvador Madagascar South Africa
Argentina Ethiopia Malawi Spain
Australia Fiji Malaysia Sri Lanka
Austria Finland Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis
Azerbaijan France Mexico St. Lucia
Bahamas Gambia Moldova St. Vincent
Bahrain Georgia Mongolia Sudan
Bangladesh Germany Morocco Suriname
Barbados Ghana Mozambique Swaziland
Belgium Greece Namibia Sweden
Belize Grenada Nepal Switzerland
Bhutan Guatemala Netherlands Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia Guinea New Zealand Taiwan Province of China
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Tajikistan
Bulgaria Guyana Nigeria Thailand
Burkina Faso Hungary Norway Tonga
Burundi Iceland Oman Trinidad and Tobago
Cambodia India Pakistan Tunisia
Canada Indonesia Panama Turkey
Cape Verde Iran Papua New Guinea Turkmenistan
Chile Ireland Paraguay Uganda
China Israel Peru Ukraine
Colombia Italy Philippines United Arab Emirates
Comoros Jamaica Poland United Kingdom
Costa Rica Japan Portugal United States
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire Jordan Romania Uruguay
Croatia Kazakhstan Russia Uzbekistan
Cyprus Kenya Samoa Vanuatu
Czech Republic Korea S˜ ao Tom´ e and Pr´ ıncipe Venezuela
Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Saudi Arabia Vietnam
Djibouti Laos Seychelles Yemen, Republic of
Dominica Latvia Singapore
Dominican Republic Lebanon Slovak Republic39
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B Deﬁnitions and Sources of Data
Budget balance (budget)
Nominal general government budget balance as percent of GDP. For some
countries no general government data has been available, as a consequence
central government data is applied.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database
Large scale extreme weather events
Disrule is the count variable for large scale extreme weather events on the
basis of a decision rule described in section 3. Disdummy taking the value one
if at least one extreme weather event in a given year and country complies
with the decision rule. Disscale is constructed by scaling the variable disrule
by last year’s real GDP level. Disrule ∗ distance is an interaction term be-
tween disrule and distance to the equator.
Source: EM-DAT Database and World Bank dataset of Dollar and Kraay
(2003)
Government debt (debt)
Nominal general government gross debt as percent of GDP. For some coun-
tries no general government data has been available, as a consequence central
government data is applied.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database
Real GDP growth rate (realgdpg)
Growth rate was calculated from real GDP data.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database
GDP gap (gdpgap)
Diﬀerence between actual and trend real GDP, as a percentage of trend real
GDP. Trend GDP is estimated using an HP-ﬁlter on real GDP. The lambda
value is chosen as 100.40
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database
Long-term nominal interest rate (li)
Data is only available for OECD countries.
Source: The OECD Economic Outlook database
Legislative election year (legelec)
Dummy variable with value 1 in years in which legislative elections took
place.
Source: Database of Political Institutions, World Bank41
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C First-diﬀerence and System GMM Estima-
tion
The ﬁrst-diﬀerence and system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bover (1998) allows tackling the following
three issues we encounter when estimating dynamic panel model of the fol-
lowing form:
Δbit = α + δΔbi,t−1 + X
 
itβ + γDit +  it (2)
with  it = μi + νit. First, in estimating equation (2) we allow for the pres-
ence of unobserved time-invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀects, which rules out
the random eﬀects estimator which is only consistent if the country-speciﬁc
eﬀects are uncorrelated with the regressors. Second, including a lagged de-
pendent variable on the right-hand side of the regressions yields inconsistent
estimates. Third, some of the explanatory variables on budget deﬁcits like
GDP growth are likely to be endogenous leading to inconsistent estimates.
By ﬁrst-diﬀerencing unobserved time-invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀects, which
are possibly correlated with the regressors, are removed. Moreover, the right-
hand side is instrumented using levels of the series lagged two periods or
more, under the assumption, that the time-varying disturbances in the orig-
inal levels are not serially correlated. This solves the problem of endogeneity
and allows consistent estimation even in the presence of measurement error
(Bond et al., 2001). As regards the system GMM estimator, the moment
restrictions of this estimator imply also the validity of lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences
of the variables as instruments for the regression in levels.
Table 8 depicts the regression results from two-step ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM
and two-step system GMM estimates. We also report the test statistics for
the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in ﬁrst diﬀerences and the Hansen test
for over-identifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis in both
provides support for the model. Roodman (2008) shows that applying too
many instruments in the GMM estimation can lead to the overﬁtting of
endogenous variables, imprecise estimates of the optimal weighting matrix
and a weakening of the Hansen test. Hence, he proposes that the number
of instruments should not exceed the number of cross-sectional units N. We42
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follow his lead and use collapsed second to third-period lags instruments in
our GMM estimations.
Table 8: Dynamic Panel Estimations

















AR (2) (p value) 0.789 0.526
Hansen’s J (p value) 0.571 0.195
Notes: Regressions include time ﬁxed eﬀects that are not reported. Standard errors are based on Wind-
meijer’s correction. */**/*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1-% signiﬁcance level. P-values are in
parenthesis. Disasterrule and legelec are assumed to be strictly exogenous . Collapsed second to third -
lag instruments are included.43
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